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ABSTRACT 
When the SARS virus broke out in Singapore, it posed a challenge to its crisis managers. The government mobilized its e-
government infrastructure as a platform to manage this crisis. The Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) 
provided IT support for contact tracing operations, a key part of containing the spread of the virus. DSTA developed an 
information system in two weeks to manage data and coordinate several agencies. Through a qualitative case study of DSTA 
and its role in supporting Singapore’s crisis management, in this paper, we detail how Singapore deployed its e-government 
infrastructure in the face of a national crisis. Crisis management needs an infrastructure for effective information sharing, and 
e-governments posses such an infrastructure with a strong reach across several agencies. The development of Case 
Management System (CMS) and its use highlights some user behavior towards data and new functionality developed to cater 
to the needs of the crisis. We suggest that such lessons grounded in Singapore’s experiences provide a useful direction for 
developing future crisis management infrastructures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the electronic commerce (e-commerce) era, citizens and business owners having had increasing exposure to offerings of 
the Internet and other digital tools such as wireless telephony now expect the same immediacy from one of their most 
important and often challenging relationships - with their government (Ho, 2002). From web-based portals to digital kiosks in 
public buildings, governments at all levels are attempting to provide real time interactive lines of communication (Layne and 
Lee, 2001). To support these activities, governments are investing in national information infrastructures (Wilson, 1997; 
Nambisan & Agarwal, 1998). These infrastructures provide the foundation for development of services that reach several 
sections of the society for a variety of purposes (Wilson, 1997). Beyond national infrastructure advanced e-governments 
provide transactional services through integration across several organizations at various stages of e-government (Moon, 
2002; Layne and Lee, 2001). With extensive infrastructure, e-governments go beyond IT to organizational routines and 
processes with embedded knowledge to help governments maximise their returns on investments (Wimmer and Traunmuller, 
2001).  
Singapore invested in information technologies through a series of infrastructural development programmes within the 
government since the late 1970’s (Gurbaxani et al, 1991) through coordinated policy development (Mechling, 1994; Ein-Dor 
et al, 1997). Through the 1990’s, Singapore developed its e-government action plan delivering its services electronically with 
transactional capabilities (e.g. Devadoss et al, 2003), earning itself second place in global e-government rankings (accenture, 
2003). The extensive use of information technologies also covers healthcare information systems that cater to several 
strategic needs (Liang, 2002). The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), in particular, posed new demands in managing 
information. The SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak affected several countries around the world from 
China to Canada in several ways. The spread of the infection was seen as a threat to public healthcare, as well as to economic 
activities of the regions (e.g. Chien and Law, 2003). 
Singapore managed the emergency effectively, deploying considerable resources from several agencies. These agencies 
coordinated through its e-government infrastructure and rapidly developed information systems to handle crucial 
communication and data exchange which were necessary during the crisis (Kun and Bray, 2002). Post SARS outbreak, these 
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systems have now become part of public crisis management tools to monitor or even predict epidemics or bio-terrorist threats 
through an early warning system (Straits Times, 2004). 
Singapore’s successful experiences thus raise two interesting research questions that guide discussions in this paper: “What 
was the role of e-government infrastructure in managing the national healthcare crisis?” and “What were the key challenges 
in managing this crisis?” In this paper we discuss in detail how Singapore leveraged its E-government infrastructure to 
manage the SARS crisis quickly and efficiently. These discussions are grounded through a descriptive case study. In the next 
section we present our research methodology, followed by a case description in section 3. In section 4, we discuss 
implications for e-governments and crisis management. We conclude the discussion in section 5. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Case study research is most appropriate in scenarios where the research question is exploratory in nature and focuses on the 
examination of contemporary events that occur beyond the control of the investigator (Yin, 1994). Qualitative research 
emphasizes the processes and meanings that are not easily quantified. It stresses how social experiences are created and given 
meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Interpretive methods of research are “aimed at producing an understanding of the 
context of the information and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the context” 
(Walsham, 1993). Hence an interpretive case study methodology has been adopted for this study, to obtain insights into the 
activities during the management of the crisis. Further, Klein and Myers (1999) discuss principles of interpretive research, 
which help researchers understand the importance of the interpretive technique in applying the global context of the case 
study to its parts and present an insight into our understanding of the events (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
The data triangulation method (Stake, 1994) was used in data collection to help verify occurrence of events (Yin, 1994). 
Primarily, 18 personal interviews were conducted to obtain a breadth of information, opinion and experience (Fontana and 
Frey, 1994). Data collected during personal interviews focused on understanding participants’ role, their contribution, 
experiences and perceptions. Due to extensive coverage of the outbreak in Singapore, abundant secondary data were collated 
to triangulate the information. The interviews were transcribed and open coded (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), from which 
themes evolved informed by a review of relevant literature.  
The interviewees were from the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) who handled the technology issues during 
the crisis and coordinated with all other agencies and users. The Defence Science and Technology Agency was formed by the 
Government of Singapore as a Statutory Board under the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in March 2000. Apart from defence 
technology support, DSTA’s development work in IT involves various applications with expertise in providing enterprise 
systems solutions, knowledge engineering, mobility, military command and control and e-government systems (Devadoss et 
al, 2003).  
SARS OUTBREAK IN SINGAPORE 
SARS in Singapore 
In February 2003, several people were diagnosed with a severe form of pneumonia in the Guangdong province of China. On 
the 12th of March 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert on the outbreak of a severe form of 
pneumonia. Following the alert, Singapore’s Ministry of Health (MOH) issued a national alert, requesting Doctors to be on 
the look out for flu like symptoms and respiratory problems in patients. The disease, named SARS by WHO, spread by close 
contact and was an airborne virus. Identifying and isolating infected patients was considered the best course of action to 
contain the virus. Contacts with every patient had to be traced and suspected carriers were quarantined at their homes. 
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Figure 1: The spread of SARS infection in Singapore (From www.moh.gov.sg) 
 
Soon more cases of the disease surfaced. Contact tracing became increasingly difficult with the growing number of index 
cases (primary carriers who infect others). On the 19th of April a new cluster of infections was discovered, which meant an 
entire wholesale market had to be shutdown and over seven hundred people were contacted to check for symptoms. Some 
infected patients had visited several General Practitioners and Sinsehs (Doctors in Chinese Medicine) before visiting a 
hospital.  
Airports were monitored to help screen passengers as they arrived in Singapore. The Immigration and Checkpoint Authority 
(ICA) worked in conjunction with the National Environment Agency (NEA) to trace passengers who needed to be 
quarantined, such as in the case of the 4th index patient who flew into Singapore with symptoms of SARS. The Ministry of 
Education (MOE) was working with the educational institutions to help trace contacts within educational institutions and 
implement screening measures to identify flu-like symptoms early. 
Tracing Contacts 
Information was passed on to the contact tracing operations centre, when a patient was identified as a suspected SARS case. 
The MOH did its own follow up and sometimes obtained information from other relevant agencies. For example, MOE 
provided some information on a student’s school, etc. The information was consolidated and sent to the operations centre, 
which traced contacts. A list of people to be issued with an HQO (Home Quarantine Order) was then delivered to CISCO. 
MOH contracted CISCO, a statutory board specializing in security services in Singapore, to help in issuing and verifying 
compliance of an HQO by 8pm everyday. CISCO’s staff then traced people in their list and issued an HQO. An Internet 
enabled camera was connected and social support provided through various agencies such as counselling, food delivery etc. 
Thus, the complete process of identifying suspect cases, their contacts and issuing the HQO involved at least 4 major 
agencies, namely, MOH, hospitals, NEA and CISCO.  
This procedure had to be completed by midnight or early morning in order to ensure immediate compliance with the HQO. 
Non-issuance or non-compliance only meant a potential increase in the number of people to be traced. “We found CISCO’s 
staff doing detective work trying to locate residents, because information given to them was often incorrect and it meant 
backlog”, noted a manager.  
MOH contacted MINDEF on the 24th of April 2003, after the wholesale market incident, to set up a bigger operations room 
for contact tracing operations. DSTA prepared an operations room with 120 stations within 48 hours.  Each station was 
equipped with email (through the Government Electronic Mail System), file and print services and internet connectivity. 
Video conferencing became a critical and useful tool to link these agencies. The capacity was subsequently increased to 250. 
A technical support team operated in shifts at the operation centre. 
The CIO of DSTA oversaw the operations and suggested that the infrastructure would still not help MOH scale its operations 
because its business process was not sufficiently streamlined. “Most of the information was in hardcopies or on spreadsheets 
with unstructured data. It would be hard to do any sort of analysis based on that data” he said. DSTA recommended 
developing an information system to cater to information co-ordination and flow. “We wanted to build something that can 
help in responding to emergencies and can be further developed later”, said the CIO. 
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Rapid Development of a Crisis Management Tool 
DSTA targeted two weeks to gather requirements and develop. It began by assembling a team that was experienced in 
network technologies, database administration, systems development, and testing. Employees were invited to join the 
development team, and asked to drop all existing projects to complete the CMS (Case Management System) in two weeks. 
Most of the invited employees began work immediately, motivated by the crisis. Another reason cited by the developers was 
also the challenge of having to develop a system in such a short time, and gathering development requirements as the system 
was being written. “It was like being in some kind of extreme programming competition!” suggested a programmer. 
DSTA previously developed a casualty management system for the Singapore Armed Forces. The project managers had prior 
experience in developing this system and used it as a starting point. To help understand linkages among infected patients and 
trace contacts, another government agency provided DSTA with software to study cross-relationships given a set of people.  
There were no established procedures in the operations room, since data management up to now had been through 
spreadsheets and individual practices to monitor and manage tracing operations. “People at the operation centre had no time 
to talk to us, they would give us the data and we had to figure out the details. Sometimes they didn’t know the complete 
process!” said a manager. The team coaxed information from the users, talking to them when possible and identified data 
sources, formats, security, and reports. Figure 2 represents information sources for contact tracing operations. 
Data Management 
Group (MOH) 
Contact Tracing Teams 
(MOH, SAF) Hospitals Efficient 
community 
contact 
tracing 
 
Figure 2: Information Management Needs that were identified for CMS 
Sources of information ranged from hospitals, Ministry of Education (MOE), and MOH to General Practitioner Doctors and 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) practitioners. Information from all sources had to be collected into a database from 
where the system would perform case management should someone be identified as a suspected or confirmed SARS patient. 
Link Analysis connected confirmed cases with suspected and probable cases, to identify potential SARS patients and monitor 
their health status. This SARS database could also be used to provide exit control with the immigration authorities (as a 
commitment to regional safety) or with MOE to isolate students who inadvertently attend schools when they should be 
quarantined.  The databases together were interfaced through the CMS and a Link Analysis system.  
System requirements changed on a daily or even hourly basis. An example is categories of potential SARS cases. There were 
initially four, which were later revised to eight different categories. “Even as we hard coded the categories, the classification 
changed, so we later made it a configurable option”, said a programmer. “Sometimes we’d make some changes on site, but 
forget to put those changes back into the development repository”, reported another programmer.  
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A reference database was created with simple contact information of as much of the population as was possible to help 
contact people quickly. This database was ineffective with no data to look up contact information. “I was told it might be 
impossible to gather such data, but I approached various government CIO’s anyway, and they agreed. When one agency 
offered its data (subject to clearance by the Ministry), they cautioned me that it was at least 3 months old. But I was ecstatic 
because back then I had no data and any data was better than that!” said the CIO. The reference database is highly sensitive 
with contact information for a high percentage of the population. “It is not a free for all as far as data is concerned. We have 
norms to conform to in handling such data” reported the CIO. All data exchange is guided by government policies to protect 
the privacy of individuals. Data access in the system is tiered into multiple layers and access to tiers controlled by levels of 
authority. 
Hospitals were an important zone in the battle against SARS. Every time a patient was identified as a SARS patient, contact 
tracing had to be carried out within the hospital to trace the movement of the patient and monitor the health of relevant staff 
and in-mates, often “taking two days”, according to a doctor. This was a critical but time consuming process and data was 
often incomplete. The hospital staff, with their limited technical expertise innovated through the use of Microsoft VisioTM to 
plot the linkages to other contacts. Technology savvy doctors helped establish initial contact tracing data systems with 
spreadsheets to help trace patients and their contacts. These spreadsheets were emailed to MOH. When DSTA was invited to 
help, a meeting with the CIO’s of all health sector agencies was held. This led to trying a system to help tag patients at 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments of the hospitals. “Using RFID made it easy to list contacts instantaneously” 
said a manager.  
Implementing CMS 
The operations centre staffed by NEA’s officers had developed their own data formats on spreadsheets, and used 
spreadsheets forwarded by other agencies. Thus with “virtually 200 different formats to resolve, data conversion was a 
difficult process” according to the project manager. The database team set about resolving these issues and populated CMS 
with the case data. The team worked on parallel implementation to ease the system in while converting data and training 
users during their breaks. “We kept the web interface as simple as we could, but some users thought spreadsheets were better 
because there were no restrictions in entering data” said the project manager. After intensive system testing, the operations 
centre switched over to CMS. DSTA then handed the system to MOH, satisfied with its stability. MOH contracted another 
agency to continue maintenance and development in accordance with its own procedures.  
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Figure 3: Screen Image of the Creating a Case on Case Management System 
On the 30th of May 2003, Singapore was declared clear of the SARS virus by WHO. On the 9th of September 2003, a new 
probable SARS case was reported in Singapore. A post-doctoral student was infected while handling virus samples in a 
laboratory and visited doctors several times with persistent fever. Within 8 hours of having identified a probable SARS 
patient and activating tracing operations, about 60 people were traced and contacted and some were issued HQO’s.  The CIO 
reported: “I wasn’t called to support, which means our system is working satisfactorily!” 
Discussion & Implications 
The SARS outbreak was a difficult challenge to Singapore, particularly in the context of the global economic slowdown. 
Hence effective and efficient action was necessary to manage the outbreak. E-government infrastructure was used as a 
suitable platform, but not as a solution in itself (Nadler and Tushman, 1997). It helped coordinate processes across several 
agencies and manage information. In this section, we discuss the importance of these experiences in the context of leveraging 
e-government infrastructure. We also explore some important directions for future research. 
E-government Infrastructure: Platform for Crisis Management  
Governments are adopting information technologies to provide integrated services to citizens (Ho, 2002). This is a difficult 
task considering the bureaucratic nature of governments (Bertschneider, 1990). However, increased adoption of technology 
has forced governments towards accepting a citizen perspective, abandoning their administration friendly approach (Lenk and 
Traunmuller, 2000). This shift has also been due to pressures to leverage existing IT investments and derive greater value 
(Bannister, 2001). Further, advanced e-government programs progress towards more integrated services (Moon, 2002; Layne 
and Lee, 2001). Infrastructure and integration are two important aspects of e-government. These two aspects of e-government 
support tele-cooperation (Wimmer and Traunmuller, 2001) to deliver integrated services (Wimmer and Traunmuller, 2001; 
Devadoss et al, 2003).  
Integration and infrastructure also benefit crisis management in many ways. The primary objective in any crisis is to give 
relevant agencies a collaborative system to share knowledge (Turoff, 2002), and enable communication and data exchange 
(Kun and Bray, 2002). During the outbreak, the contact tracing operations centre for 110 stations was established within 48 
hours and connected to the government network. A complete information system was developed in 11 days to manage 
information related to the emergency. Organizations exchanged data securely, through government email systems, to help 
contact tracing operations. This was enabled by extensive e-services that possessed updated contact information, helping to 
quickly contain the spread of the SARS virus. In summary, the crisis management tools relied on the e-government 
infrastructure to operate, and used data from e-government services shared by respective agencies. 
The development of CMS and its circumstances has prompted establishing crisis management tools that can cater to such 
needs in the future, such as an early warning system monitoring some symptoms at clinics (Straits Times, 2004). Particularly 
in the context of bio-terrorist threats or even the recurrence of SARS or other epidemics, appropriate information 
infrastructures could serve these dual purposes (Kun and Bray, 2002). E-government provides suitable platforms for 
development of such information infrastructures because of their extensive reach and databases. Leveraging e-government 
infrastructures and capabilities however, is not an automatic process. In Singapore, there was no prior experience or 
procedures and the government had to adapt to evolving conditions.  
Crisis Management: New Demands from SARS Experiences 
Advanced applications of technology within e-governments have also centred on vertical and horizontal integration in order 
to provide more integrated services to citizens (Moon, 2002). A significant benefit of information technologies is the ability 
to implement changes through windows of opportunities (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994). This is particularly true during a crisis, 
since every crisis is unique. Thus, a common infrastructure would be necessary (Arens and Rosenbloom, 2003). Leveraging 
IT capabilities, identifying, creating and responding to changes quickly become relevant to e-governments in this respect. 
Further, Singapore’s crisis managers focused on accurate data gathering and secure data sharing through IT. 
In managing SARS, Singapore realized the need to exchange information quickly and efficiently across several agencies. 
CMS was deployed for his purpose. However, the CMS was insufficient to detect a possible outbreak of the symptoms of the 
disease in Singapore. CMS was not sensing data from the sources that could enable such functionality. This was addressed 
through an early warning system (Straits Times, 2004) that is now being tried in a few clinics to capture and analyze the 
outbreak of some key symptoms in regions across the country.  The need for an operations room was another outcome of the 
experiences of SARS management. An equipped operations centre is now on standby, ready to swing into action within a 
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couple of hours. Hospitals and organizations dealing with large gatherings are also preparing standard operating procedures 
to deal with crisis situations.  
Singapore also experimented with RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) to tag patients at emergency wards to improve the 
accuracy of its data during contact tracing. Also, several government agencies contributed data to the development of an 
effective system in managing the SARS crisis. The variety of data sources and its availability was an advantage in the 
effectiveness of the CMS in Singapore. The ability to identify and gather relevant data from a variety of sources was enabled 
through an effective use of the e-government infrastructure. DSTA took great care in ensuring secure access and availability 
of such data during management of the crisis. 
Systems Users: Adapting to Structured Data Exchange 
As is often during a crisis, users work long shifts trying to ease the situation, and have little time to learn new systems 
(Turoff, 2002). Hence, the choice of an appropriate interface is important. However, the quality of the data gathered and 
entered into the system is also important. The web browser is often the preferred interface due to its popularity, familiarity, 
and simplicity (Milford, 2000). Managing SARS provided managers with useful insights into user behaviour.  
Singapore’s high technology adoption was visible with several distributed users relying on spreadsheets and charting 
software to represent and exchange data during the crisis. However, such applications were unstructured data sharing 
mechanisms, and users had a strong preference towards unstructured data entry. Users familiar with spreadsheets queried if 
they could see all the data at once instead of a case-by-case view as designed in the CMS. “They wanted to all the data at 
once as in the spreadsheet, and did not want to click here and there for different views.” reported the CIO.  
The preference could be attributed to the uncertainty as to the relevance and need for information gathered and any data was 
considered better during the early days of the crisis. This notion was challenged with the arrival of CMS, and users had to 
learn to structure their data input and obtain more meaningful inputs to systematically track case data. “Some of the early data 
was just ‘Uncle One’ or ‘Aunty One’ making it impossible to do anything useful with it” added another manager. 
Another impact of the system change was in training the users. CMS was a web-based system, designed to simplify data 
presentation and provide a familiar interface to users. The older users were not comfortable with the interface and preferred a 
spreadsheet layout that could be scrolled to input any information at any point. The younger army recruits, who also manned 
a portion of the operations room, reported the interface “familiar and easy to use”.   
CONCLUSION 
E-governments are growing towards greater vertical and horizontal integration of services (Moon, 2002). By studying the 
management of the SARS viral outbreak in Singapore, we illustrate the use of e-government infrastructures towards 
developing crisis management tools. Crisis management needs many applications to cater to information needs (Kun and 
Bray, 2002), and Singapore’s experiences suggest that e-government provides a suitable platform for deploying these 
systems. E-government infrastructure’s reach into governments can provide the common infrastructures that crisis 
management needs (Arens and Rosenbloom, 2003). 
A closer examination of the case reveals two interesting aspects of user behaviour and system functionality. Though e-
governments can deliver new functionality for any crisis through their IT infrastructure and capabilities, the SARS crisis 
highlighted the need for development of contact databases and systematic management of individual cases leading to accurate 
nationwide data. The focus was to get data input as accurate as possible and share it effectively. Users’ interaction with the 
system revealed the advantage of simple browser interfaces, and the need for training despite its simplicity. Crisis managers 
need to train users despite the time constraints during a crisis (Turoff, 2002). 
WHO has warned that the SARS virus is possibly only the first of several health scares. It is thus essential that governments 
focus on managing such health crises and develop an infrastructure to manage similar threats such as bio-terrorism (Kun and 
Bray, 2002; Turoff, 2002; Arens and Rosenbloom, 2003). Through a discussion of Singapore’s experiences we highlight 
some directions for crisis managers in the form leveraging e-government infrastructures, managing new functionalities and 
user interactions. While the discussions are grounded in Singapore’s experiences, these lessons are also useful in developing 
our knowledge in effectively managing crises. Singapore has now institutionalised these systems and hopes to be fully ready 
to tackle a recurrence of SARS within 2 hours, as well as use these experiences as baseline for new crises. 
REFERENCES 
1. Accenture, 2003, http://www.accenture.com 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004  2127
Devadoss et al.  Leveraging E-government Infrastructure for Crisis Management 
2. Arens, Y, and Rosenbloom, P. S. (2003) Responding to the Unexpected, Communications of the ACM, 46, 9, 33-35. 
3. Bannister, F. (2001) Dismantling the Silos: Extracting new value from IT investments in public administration, 
Information Systems Journal, 11, 4, 65-84. 
4. Bretschneider, S. (1990) Management information systems in public and private organizations: an empirical test, Public 
Administration Review, 50, 5, 536–545. 
5. Chien, C. L. G. and Law, R. (2003) The Impact of the Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Hotels: A case study of 
Hong Kong, Hospitality Management, 22, 327-332. 
6. Denzin N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (1994) Handbook of qualitative research, Sage Publications 
7. Devadoss, R. P, Pan S-L, and Huang, J. C. (2003) Structurational analysis of e-government initiatives: a case study of 
SCO, Decision Support Systems, 34, 3, 253-269 
8. Ein-Dor, Philip; Myers, D. Michael; Raman, K.S. (1997) Information Technology in Three small developed countries, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 13, 4, 61-90 
9. Fontana, A., and Frey, J. H. (1994) Interviewing: The art of science, In: Denzin N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds), 
Handbook of qualitative research, 361-376 Sage Publications 
10. Gurbaxani, V., Kraemer, K., King, J. L., Jarman, S., Dedrick, J., Raman, K.S., and Yap, C. S. (1990) Government as the 
Driving Force Toward the Information Society: National Computer Policy in Singapore, Information Society, 7, 2, 155-
185. 
11. Ho Tat-Kei A. (2002) Reinventing Local Governments and the E-Government Initiative, Public Administration Review, 
62, 4, 434-444. 
12. Klein, H. K. and Myers, M. D. (1999) A set of principles for conducting and evaluating interpretive field studies in 
information systems, MIS Quarterly, 23(1), 67-94. 
13. Kun G. L., and Bray A. D. (2002) Information Infrastructure Tools for Bioterrorism Preparedness, IEEE Engineering in 
Medicine and Biology, 21, 5, 69-85. 
14. Layne, K., and Lee, J. (2001) Developing a Fully Functional E-Government: A Four Stage Model, Government 
Information Quarterly, 18, 122-136. 
15. Lenk, K. and Traunmuller, R. (2000) A Framework for electronic Government, Proceedings of the 11th International 
Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, 340-345. 
16. Liang, T. Y. (2002) Strategic exploitation of information and communication technology in the healthcare sector, Human 
Systems Management, 21, 4, 241-248.  
17. Milford, H. S. (2000) Racing to e-government: Using the Internet for citizen service delivery, Government Finance 
Review, 2000, 16, 5, 21-22. 
18. Mechling, J. (1994) Reengineering Government: Is there a ’there’ there? Public Productivity and Management Review, 
18, 2, 189-197. 
19. Moon, M. (2002) The Evolution of E-Government Among Municipalities: Rhetoric or Reality? Public Administration 
Review, 62, 4, 424-433. 
20. Nadler, D. and Tushman, M. (1997) Competing By Design: The Power of Organizational Architecture Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
21. Nambisan, S. and Agarwal, R. (1998) The Adoption and use of national information infrastructure: A social network and 
stakeholder perspective, Proceedings of the International conference on information systems. 
22. Turoff, M. (2002) Past and Future Emergency Response Information Systems, Communications of the ACM, 45, 4, 29-
32. 
23. Tyre, M.J. and Orlikowski, W.J. (1994) Windows of opportunity: temporal patterns of technological adaptation in 
organizations, Organization Science, 5, 1, 98–118.  
24. Stake, R. E. (1994) Case Studies, In: Denzin N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (Editors), Handbook of qualitative research, Sage 
Publications, 236-247 
25. Straits Times, The (Singapore). (2004) New disease alert system coming up, January 13, 2004, Singapore. 
26. Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques, 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004  2128
Devadoss et al.  Leveraging E-government Infrastructure for Crisis Management 
27. Walsham, G. (1993) Interpreting Information Systems in Organizations, Wiley, Chichester. 
28. Wilson, E. J. (1997) Introduction: The what, why, where and how of national information initiatives, in B. Khanin and 
E.J. Wilson (eds.), National information infrastructure initiatives: Vision and Policy Design, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
29. Wirnmer, M. and Traunmuller, R. (2000) Trends in electronic government: managing distributed knowledge, 
Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, 340-345.  
30. Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. 
 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004  2129
